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PASSING THE "OPERATOR" BUCK IN UNITED STATES v.
TOWNSHIP OF BRIGHTON: WHETHER POLLUTION-RELATED
OR GENERAL ACTIVITIES CREATE CERCLA LIABILITY
FOR A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Township of Brighton,1 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that Brighton Township, a governmental entity,
should be held liable as an operator under the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA),2 based on the entity's regulatory activities at a privately-
owned landfill, if it asserted actual control over the facility's day-to-
day operations. 3 The Brighton Township court, however, left open
the question of whether these day-to-day operations are limited to
pollution-related activities at the facility or if the day-to-day opera-
tions extend to general operations of the facility as a whole, because
the Sixth Circuit failed to specify the factors considered in making
that determination. 4 The court thus passed the buck to lower
courts and left them to weigh compelling policy interests in answer-
ing the question for themselves. 5
1. 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 101-308, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
3. See United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 313-16 (6th Cir.
1998). Judge Boggs stated that the issue of what level of control over a facility
renders a governmental entity an operator was one of first impression in the Sixth
Circuit. See id. at 313. Writing the majority opinion for the court, Judge Boggs
held that although "mere regulation" of a facility is insufficient to render a govern-
mental entity an operator, actual operation or actual control over the day-to-day
operations of a facility suffices. Id. at 316. Judge Boggs highlighted that an actual
control test should be applied, that affirmative acts by the governmental entity are
required and that regulation of the facility must be extensive enough to equate to
actual operation of the facility. See id. at 314-16.
4. See id. at 314-16. Judge Boggs defined operator status solely in terms of
"'direct[ing] the workings of, manag[ing], or conduct[ing] the affairs of a facil-
ity,'" and thus ignored the requirement of United States v. Bestfoods that such activi-
ties be specifically related to pollution. Id. at 314 (quoting Bestfoods, U.S._, 118
S. Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998)). For a discussion of Judge Boggs' failure to include in
his definition of operator status any explicit factors to assist lower courts in making
the operator determination for a governmental regulatory entity, see infra note 97
and accompanying text.
5. See generally Diana Ng, Debating the Wisdom of Placing Superfund Costs on Mu-
nicipalities, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 2193, 2193-204 (1996) (discussing competing policy
interests at stake in conferring liability upon governmental entities).
(361)
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Holding a governmental entity liable under CERCLA creates a
difficult situation because it implicates competing policy concerns.
6
One argument in favor of limiting CERCLA governmental liability
is that imposing liability unfairly punishes the government for per-
forming its public functions.7 Under this view, because governmen-
tal entities operate on a non-profit basis under tight monetary
budgets, they are ill-equipped to bear the costs of cleaning up haz-
ardous waste sites.8
An argument against limiting governmental liability is that it is
essential to promote CERCLA's goal of "making the polluter pay." 9
6. See id. at 2193 (explaining debate among municipalities, private parties and
legislators regarding whether municipalities may be held liable under CERCLA,
noting several federal courts have held municipalities are to be deemed liable).
See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199-1206 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding municipalities liable under CERCLA for sending residential household
waste to landfills); Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 960-
61 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding municipality liable as arranger under CERCLA); New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection & Energy v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Servs.,
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (D.NJ. 1993) (stating municipalities are included in
CERCLA's definition of "persons" who may incur liability); Anderson v. City of
Minnetonka, No. CV 3-90-312, 1993 WL 95361, at *11-13 (D. Minn.Jan. 27, 1993)
(holding municipality liable for depositing household waste at landfill because
waste could constitute "hazardous substance" under CERCLA). Despite these
holdings, however, parties continue to debate the policy issues that arise from ap-
plying CERCLA liability to municipalities. See Ng, supra note 5, at 2194.
7. See Ng, supra note 5, at 2201-02. One author explained that subjecting gov-
ernmental entities to liability creates a "no-win situation" because although the
necessity of regulating services prevents governmental entities from ceasing provi-
sion of services, governmental entities nevertheless are forced to subject them-
selves to threat of extensive CERCLA liability. See id. (citing Joseph M. Manko &
Madeleine H. Cozine, The Battle Over Municipal Liability Under CERCLA Heats Up: An
Analysis of Proposed Congressional Amendments to Superfund, 5 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 23, 32
(1994)). For further discussion of this principle, see Manko & Cozine, supra, at 32
(explaining impracticality and probable illegality of local governments' withdrawal
of services).
8. See Ng, supra note 5, at 2202 (explaining unlike private parties, local gov-
ernments cannot absorb cleanup costs by passing such costs to consumers and
must instead pass costs on to taxpayers; and such cost shifting undermines CER-
CLA's underlying policy because Congress intended for local industry, not local
taxpayers, to pick up tab for hazardous waste cleanup) (citations omitted). See also
G. Nelson Smith, III, Trashing the Town and Making It Pay: The Problem with the Mu-
nicipal Liability Scheme Under CERCLA, 26 CONN. L. REv. 585, 596 (1994) (explain-
ing governmental entity may be forced to increase taxes to raise revenue to pay
cleanup costs, and may also have to cut essential services to community, file for
bankruptcy or even issue bonds). Judge Boggs touched on this argument in Brigh-
ton Township when he acknowledged in his opinion that "if Brighton Township had
been willing to spend more money in the 1960s and 1970s," it could have made
different arrangements for disposal of local waste and thereby avoided liability.
Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 316.
9. Charisse Marie Fraccasia, Taking Responsibility, Passing the Buck, and Cleaning
Up the Mess: Making Municipal Liability Under CERCLA Work, 44 CAsE W. REs. L. REV.
1093, 1115 (1995) (stating "responsibility is critical to any environmental solution"
and is rationale for "polluter pays" principle which underlies CERCLA). See also
2
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The rationale supporting this argument is that leniency on govern-
mental entities discourages them from implementing better envi-
ronmental regulations and unfairly forces private parties to bear
cleanup costs.10 It follows that taxpayers, not private parties, should
bear cleanup costs because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of
governmental regulatory activities.11
Because both sides of the policy argument are compelling,
courts need a concrete, objective standard to determine the liabil-
ity of governmental entities based on their regulatory activities. 12
The Sixth Circuit did not provide such a standard in Brighton Town-
ship. Instead, it issued a decision containing three opinions, each of
which sets forth different operator standards. 13
Part II of this Note sets forth the facts of Brighton Township.14
Next, Part III discusses CERCLA's liability scheme and outlines the
case law pertaining to the operator liability of governmental entities
engaged in regulatory activities. 15 Then, Part IV discusses the ma-
jority opinion, concurrence and dissent of Brighton Township.16
Ng, supra note 5, at 2199-201 (discussing arguments against limiting municipal
liability).
10. See Manko & Cozine, supra note 7, at 34 (stating such lenient liability
schemes would both hamper remediation process as well as provide disincentive
for local governments to implement more sound environmental procedures for
handling hazardous wastes).
11. See Fraccascia, supra note 9, at 1117 (stating residents of municipality are
responsible for creating household waste and should be held responsible for costs
associated with cleanup). See also Molly A. Meegan, Municipal Liability for Hazardous
Household Hazardous Waste: An Analysis of the Superfund Statute and Its Policy Implica-
tions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1783, 1797-98 (1991) (discussing ways in which liability can be
tailored to consider municipalities' unique characteristics).
12. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 323-25. In her concurrence, Judge
Moore weighed concerns about the potential chilling effect on governmental re-
medial efforts against CERCLA's "polluter pays" principle. See id. She then ex-
pressed the Sixth Circuit's task by stating, "[tlhus, our task of identifying when a
governmental entity becomes an operator requires us to balance carefully CERCLA's
broad remedial purpose against concerns of deterring state involvement in regulat-
ing hazardous waste management and clean-up." Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
13. For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's failure to set forth an inclusive,
objective standard by which to gauge the operator liability of a governmental regu-
latory entity, see infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
likely impact of this absence of guidance, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying
text.
14. For a discussion of the facts and procedural history of Brighton Township,
see infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of CERCLA's liability scheme and an outline of the case
law pertaining to the operator liability of governmental entities engaged in regula-
tory activities, including a comparison of which test to apply in making such a
determination, see infra notes 33-87 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the three opinions the Sixth Circuit set forth in Brigh-
ton Township, see infra notes 88-124 and accompanying text.
1999]
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Subsequently, Part V focuses on the Sixth Circuit's failure to deter-
mine whether either pollution-related activities or general activities
are the prerequisite for governmental operator liability. Further,
Part V illustrates the need for a more definitive standard. 17 Last,
Part VI demonstrates that in the absence of such a definitive stan-
dard, policy arguments regarding leniency for governmental enti-
ties will prove to be outcome-determinative. 18
II. FACTS
At issue in Brighton Township was a fifteen-acre landfill, located
in the township, that the Collett family owned from 1960 until its
forced closing in 1973.19 While the Colletts owned the landfill, they
entered into a series of contracts with the township which progres-
sively required the Colletts to conform to more specifications en-
gendered by the township Board of Appeals. 20 Until 1967, the
contracts permitted the Colletts to independently arrange to accept
all kinds of waste from outside sources. 21 From 1967 until 1973,
however, the Board agreed to pay the Colletts a higher fee in return
for the Colletts' restriction of the use of the landfill to township
17. For a critical analysis of each of the Sixth Circuit's opinions in Brighton
Township, see infra notes 125-65 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the likely effect policy arguments will have on courts'
decisions in light of the Sixth Circuit's failure to set forth a definitive standard in
Brighton Township, see infra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
19. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 310. Vaughan Collett owned the landfill
property from 1960 until 1971; his son, Jack, then assumed ownership through
1973. See id. In 1973 the township closed the dump for its repeated inability to
meet state regulations regarding the maintenance of a landfill. See id. at 311.
20. See id. The 1960 agreement provided that the township would use the site
as a landfill for town residents, and the minutes from the Brighton Township
Board meeting regarding that contract stated that the landfill would have to "meet
specifications of and be under the supervision of the [township's] Board of Ap-
peals." Id. at 310. The agreement required the township to pay Vaughan Collett
$60 per month in rent and $10 per month for maintenance, in return for which
Collett was to maintain the facility and retain full salvage rights. See id. Also, the
agreement made admission to the landfill free for township residents and allowed
Collett to make fee arrangements with any non-residents who used the landfill. See
id.
The 1961 agreement changed the relationship between Collett and the town-
ship. See id. In it, the township clarified that Collett could not accept commercial
or industrial waste from residents, but was permitted to make separate arrange-
ments to accept it. See id. The 1965 contract then reversed the township's posi-
tion, allowing local commercial waste from residents to be dumped at the landfill.
See id.
21. See id.
4
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residents. 22 The township also made additional appropriations to
the landfill for repair, maintenance and cleanup. 23
Problems began in 1965 when Vaughan Collett, having diffi-
culty maintaining the landfill, asked the Board for financial help
cleaning it up. 2 4 After considering the landfill's failure to comply
with state regulations, the Board arranged to have parts of the land-
fill bulldozed and removed.2 5 Nonetheless, conditions worsened,
and in 1971 the Michigan Department of Public Health threatened
to take legal steps to close the landfill if the township did not mea-
surably improve the landfill.26 In 1973 the Board closed the landfill
because it was unable to meet the state's regulations. 27
Subsequently, after investigating the landfill in 1989 and 1990,
the federal government determined that the site qualified for a
22. See id. Under the agreement that was in effect from 1967 through 1973,
non-residents and industrial customers, who formerly were allowed to contract sep-
arately with Collett, were unable to use the landfill. See id. The township's
monthly fees to Collett increased from 1967 through 1973, the first monthly fee in
1963 being $70, and the last monthly fee set in 1971 being $500 for rental and an
additional $666 for maintenance. See id.
23. See id. at 310-11. The extra appropriations were for "dump repair," "addi-
tional expenses," bulldozing, plowing for fire protection, fees for a bulldozing
company, snow removal and crane work. Id. The Board made the following ap-
propriations to Vaughan Collett: $600 in 1968; $1,400 in 1969; $12,000 in 1970;
and $14,000 in 1971. See id. When the landfill closed in 1973, the Board made
final appropriations to jack Collett to cover the landfill and for other rehabilitative
work, totaling $4,214 to be paid if the county health department and township
officials were satisfied with their completion. See id.
24. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 311. Although the township first re-
fused to provide Vaughan Collett with cleanup funds, it later obtained an estimate
for "excavating and covering" some "old scrap" at the landfill. Id. In 1966,
Vaughan Collett asked the township to provide a bulldozer. See id.
25. See id. The Board determined that after some changes the landfill would
be able to comply with the state regulations. See id. In August of 1966, the Board
established a committee to examine the landfill's problems and report what could
be done to fix them. See id. In May of 1967, the Board arranged for additional
bulldozing and inquired about having the Brighton Township Junior Fire Depart-
ment burn some of the accumulated debris at the landfill. See id. When the Michi-
gan state government began regulating landfills more seriously in the late 1960s,
the county sanitarian, sometimes with township officials, visited the landfill. See id.
26. See id. From 1971 through 1972, the Michigan Department of Public
Health sent several letters to the township supervisor in which it gave notice of the
sanitarian's findings. See id. These findings included inadequate protection of the
groundwater, inadequate cover over the refuse, no refuse compaction, absence of
a responsible director of the facility, fires burning in the refuse and a salvage oper-
ation in complete disarray. See id. Although one letter noted the elimination of
fires and improvement in the piles of appliances and cars, the threat to close the
dump remained in force. See id.
27. See id. The "insufficiency of alternative facilities" delayed the township in
closing the landfill. Id. Once the township remedied the problems with the alter-
natives, the township closed the landfill and notified the state health officer that
the township had fulfilled its cleanup duties. See id.
1999] 365
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CERCLA removal action, the cost of which eventually reached
$500,000.28 In March of 1994 the United States filed suit against
Jack Collett and the township in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan for recovery of response costs involved in the
cleanup of the site.29 The district court found both Collett and the
township jointly and severally liable for all response costs. 30 The
township appealed to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the district
court erred in finding it liable as an operator of the landfill.31 The
28. See id. at 311-12. The 1989 federal field investigation team found hazard-
ous materials at the site, particularly concentrated around a section of 200 drums
in poor condition. See id. at 311. The 1990 Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) technical assessment team determined that the site met the criteria of the
National Contingency Plan, which is the CERCLA set of regulations that provides
the criteria for a CERCLA removal action. See id. at 312. The estimated cost of the
removal action in 1990 exceeded $400,000. See id. Through 1995, however, the
United States incurred an actual cost of $490,948, exclusive of interest. See id.
29. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 312.
30. See id. In March of 1996, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan entered a default judgment against Jack Collett, who later did not ap-
peal. See id. Later that month the district court ruled from the bench and found
both Collett and the township jointly and severally liable for the full amount of
response costs and postjudgment interest. See id. The district court entered final
judgment in May of 1996, and both the United States and Brighton Township
appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
See id.
31. See id. Brighton Township raised two additional issues on appeal. See id.
First, Brighton Township argued that this "facility" was improperly defined to in-
clude the township dump and that the landfill did not meet the definition of facil-
ity listed in CERCLA sections 101(9) (A) and (B). It argued that because the
township dumped on only three acres in the southwest corner of the landfill's
fifteen acres, and because the government found no hazardous waste on those
three acres, the government should have excluded those three acres from the
boundaries of the facility. See id. The Sixth Circuit rejected the township's argu-
ment based on the Colletts' having moved refuse around on the property and
having placed materials from non-residents and industries in other parts of the
site. See id. at 312-13. The court explained that because the Colletts used the en-
tire property as a landfill, the district court properly classified it as a single facility.
See id. at 313. Other courts have similarly held that a facility is defined by the
bounds of the entire site on which it is located. See, e.g., City of North Miami v.
Berger, 828 F. Supp. 401, 407-08 (E.D. Va. 1993); Rhodes v. County of Darlington,
833 F. Supp. 1163, 1177-78 (D.S.C. 1992) (relying on listing of "landfill" in CER-
CLA section 101 (9) (A) as mandate that entire landfill site be deemed facility). At
least one court, however, has permitted the division of an entire site into various
facilities. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Inc., 966 F.2d 837, 842-43
(4th Cir. 1992) (relying on CERCLA section 101 (9) (B) to limit bounds of facility
to only "area where hazardous substances had come to be located" surrounding
underground storage tanks). For an analysis of the way in which courts determine
what constitutes a "facility," see generally William B. Johnson, What Constitutes 'Fa-
cility'Within the Meaning of § 101 (9) of the Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S. C.A. § 9601(9)), 147 A.L.R. FED. 469,
488-95, § 2(b) (1996). For the text of CERCLA section 101(9), see infra note 37.
Second, Brighton Township appealed the district court's finding that liability
for the conditions was not divisible and that the township was jointly and severally
liable for all response costs. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 312, 317. Based on
[Vol. X: p. 361
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Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's opinion and remanded the
issue of the township's operator status to the district court to apply
the standards set forth in the Sixth Circuit opinion. 32
III. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA's Statutory Scheme
In 1980 Congress passed CERCLA in an attempt to remedy the
serious environmental and health effects of inactive hazardous
waste sites.33 CERCLA provides strict, joint and several liability for
responsible parties.3 4 Courts consider CERCLA a remedial statute
the district court's finding that the harm was not divisible because Brighton Town-
ship did not meet its burden of proof to establish that there was a "reasonable basis
to conclude that the harm [was] divisible," the Sixth Circuit's task was to define
what constitutes "a reasonable basis." Id. at 318 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433A (1965)). Holding that proper divisibility factors are based on
causation, rather than on equity or normative fault, the court of appeals declined
to make an exhaustive list of bases for apportioning causation and remanded to
the district court the divisibility of harm issue. See id. at 319-20.
For a discussion of the equity-based factors the Sixth Circuit declined to select,
see Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 317-19 (discussing "Gore factors"). See also
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 n.22 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
equitable factors as basis for divisibility and stating factors pertinent to contribu-
tion actions); In re Bell Petroluem Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 901 (5th Cir. 1993)
(adopting and listing "Gore factors"). For a discussion of the township's causation-
based arguments for apportionment, see Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 319-20.
32. See id. at 321-22. For a discussion of the majority decision in Brighton
Township, see infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
33. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 101-308 94 Stat. 2767, (1980) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994) (stating CERCLA provides "for liability,
compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for inactive hazardous sub-
stances released into the environment and cleanup of inactive waste disposal
sites")). See also Steven G. Davison, Governmental Liability Under CERCLA, 25 B.C.
ENVrL. AFF. L. REv. 47, 48 (1997) (quoting B.R. MacKay & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 633 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (D. Utah 1986) (stating Congress passed CERCLA
"in response to increasing concern over the severe environmental and public
health effects from improper disposal of hazardous waste and other hazardous sub-
stances")); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1500 (6th Cir. 1989)
(discussing CERCLA's goal of cleaning up hazardous waste sites).
34. See CERCLA § 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). Section 101 (32) states that
CERCLA liability "shall be construed to be the standard of liability" under section
311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994), which provides for strict
liability. Id. The legislative history of CERCLA also illustrates congressional intent
to impose strict liability. See 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Ran-
dolph) (stating, despite concessions Congress made in compromise bill, "[w]e
have kept strict liability in the compromise..."); H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3038 ("Liability for the cost of clean-
ups under CERCLA is 'strict, joint and several.'"). See also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating "CERCLA imposes
strict liability on responsible parties"); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding "we agree with the overwhelming body of prece-
dent that has interpreted section 107(a) as establishing a strict liability scheme [for
CERCLAI"); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985)
1999]
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and construe it liberally to effectuate its two primary goals: (1) to
cleanup hazardous waste sites and (2) to make responsible parties
pay for the cleanup. 35
(stating, "Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even
though an explicit provision for strict liability was not included in the
compromise").
Under CERCLA, liability for responsible parties is also joint and several. See
R.W Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1507; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 990 F.2d
711, 722 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating CERCLA imposes joint and several liability for
indivisible harm and allows for apportionment when "two or more persons inde-
pendently are responsible for a single harm that is divisible" (citing Monsanto, 858
F.2d at 171-73)). A defendant may escape the imposition ofjoint and several liabil-
ity by establishing one of the following defenses.
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a per-
son otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a [wholly unrelated] third party ....
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See also Amy C. Stovall, Note, Limiting Oper-
ator Liability for Parent Corporations Under CERCLA: United States v. Cordova Chemical
Co., 43 VILL. L. REv. 219, 232 n.37 (1998) (stating, "although the statute includes
these defenses, courts interpret them very narrowly, limiting their successful use by
litigants") (citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 970 (C.D. Cal.
1993)); John M. Hyson, "Fairness" and Joint and Several Liability in Government Cost
Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21 HAv. ENvrL. L. REv. 137, 142 (1997) (stating
federal courts presume joint and several liability for defendants who are liable
under section 107(a) and have no defense to liability under section 107(b));
LyndaJ. Oswald, New Directions in Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA?, 28 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 299, 314-16 (1995) (discussing burden shifting under CERCLA liabil-
ity scheme).
35. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038 (stating CERCLA's two primary goals are "(1) to provide for cleanup if
a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is
threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-
ups"). The House Report describes the goals of CERCLA as:
an inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites in a systematic manner, es-
tablishment of priorities among the sites based on relative danger, a re-
sponse program to contain dangerous releases from inactive hazardous
waste sites, acceleration of the elimination of unsafe hazardous waste
sites, and a systematic program of funding to identify, evaluate and take
responsive actions at inactive hazardous waste sites to assure protection of
public health and the environment in a cost effective manner.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 25. See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus
Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating CERCLA is construed
liberally to achieve goals of statute); B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197
(2d Cir. 1992) (explaining, "[i]n CERCLA Congress enacted a broad remedial stat-
ute designed to enhance the authority of the EPA to respond effectively and
promptly to toxic pollutant spills"); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (describing CERCLA as "broad response
and reimbursement statute"). For a list of additional authorities, see Stovall, supra
note 34, at 284 n.28.
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A defendant is liable for response costs under CERCLA if a
plaintiff fulfills four requirements. 36  First, the contaminated site
must qualify as a "facility. '37 Second, the defendant must fall within
one or more of the four classifications of responsible "persons"
listed in section 107(a) of CERCLA, one of which is the operator
classification. 38 Third, there must be a "release" or "threatened re-
lease" of a hazardous substance from the site. 39 Fourth, the plain-
36. See Oswald, supra note 34, at 314-18 (noting CERCLA does not burden
plaintiff with showing defendant's actions caused harm). The author explains that
courts "have determined that [placing] a proximate causation requirement [upon
the plaintiff] would conflict with CERCLA's statutory goal of promoting cleanup of
contaminated sites by requiring the government to meet an extremely high bur-
den of proof and by diverting government funds from cleanup actions to litigation
costs." Id. at 318. See also Alcan Aluminum, 990 F.2d at 722 (explaining, "[t]he
[plaintiff] has no burden of proof with respect to what caused the release of haz-
ardous waste and triggered response costs," but instead, "[defendant] as the pol-
luter bears the ultimate burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning
liability"). But see Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 n.17 (explaining even though sec-
tion 107(a) imposes strict liability and does not require plaintiff to prove causa-
tion, defendant may raise causation as defense).
37. See CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). CERCLA section 101(9) de-
fines "facility" as:
(A) Any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage
container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited,
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but
does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any
vessel.
Id. For the Sixth Circuit's holding in Brighton Township regarding whether the
landfill qualified as a "facility," see supra note 31.
38. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CERCLA section 107(a) pro-
vides for four categories of responsible "persons":
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of the disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment .... of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person .... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities ... from which there is a
release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of re-
sponse costs, of a hazardous substance ....
Id.
39. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) (4) (setting forth requirement
of "a release, or a threatened release . . . . "). CERCLA section 101 (22) defines
"release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharg-
ing, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment
.... "Id. § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(22).
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tiff must incur response costs as a result of the release or threatened
release of hazardous substances. 40
B. Operator Status of Governmental Entity
This Note focuses on the second of these requirements, which
is the classification of a governmental entity as an operator under
CERCLA section 107(a). 41 Because a governmental entity is a "per-
son" under section 101(21), it may be liable as an owner or opera-
tor under section 107(a) in the same way as a private entity. 42 Thus,
40. See CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (4) (stating requirement re-
lease or threatened release "cause[ ] the incurrence of response costs . . . ").
Although CERCLA does not specifically define the term "response costs," it does
define the terms "response" and "respond" to mean "remove, removal, remedy,
and remedial action; all such terms (including the terms 'removal' and 'remedial
action') include enforcement activities related thereto." Id. § 101 (25), 42 U.S.C.
9601(25) (footnote omitted).
41. This Note focuses on the "operator" category of "persons" CERCLA sec-
tions 107(a) (1) and (2) contain. SeeCERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). CER-
CLA sections 107(a)(1)-(4) list the other categories of "persons," including
"owner" and "arranger." Id. For the text of CERCLA section 107(a), see supra
note 38.
This Note construes CERCLA section 107(a) (1) to mean the "owner or opera-
tor" of a facility. Confusion arises in interpreting CERCLA's "owner" and "opera-
tor" provisions. CERCLA section 107(a) (1) imposes liability on the "owner and
operator" of a facility. See CERCLA § 107 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a) (1) (emphasis
added). CERCLA section 107(a)(2), however, imposes liability on those who
"owned or operated" a facility at the time of the disposal of the hazardous sub-
stances. See CERCLA § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2) (emphasis added). This
textual difference invites defendants to argue that liability attaches only if the cur-
rent owner and the current operator are the same person. See John Copeland
Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1405, 1413 (1997) (seizing on
conflicts created by "and" and "or" variances in statutory language). Courts have
consistendy rejected this argument since CERCLA's inception in 1980. See, e.g.,
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 94 F.3d 1489, 1497-98 (11th
Cir. 1996) (finding "owner or operator" is proper interpretation of statute);
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990) (in-
ferring Congress's failure to define term "owner and operator" in CERCLA proved
use to be mistaken). Indeed, prior to 1995, textual arguments relying on the
"owner and operator" language of CERCLA section 107(a) (1) failed in every case
in which a CERCLA defendant raised it. See Nagle, supra, at 1413. The one case in
which the argument was successful was reversed on appeal. See Redwing Carriers,
875 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (S.D. Ala. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in part, 94 F.3d 1489,
1497-98 (11 th Cir. 1996) (stating Eleventh Circuit interprets "owner and operator"
as disjunctive).
42. See CERCLA § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). CERCLA section 101 (21)
defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, con-
sortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, mu-
nicipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." Id.
See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989); FMC Corp. v. United
States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 840 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc); Thiokol
Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1993); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1199 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that governmental
entity may be held liable under CERCLA sections 107(a) and 117(f) in same way as
[Vol. X: p. 361
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a governmental entity may be liable based on either ownership of
its own facility or, as in Brighton Township, operation of a privately-
owned facility.43
Although courts agree that a governmental entity may qualify
as an operator, they have not set forth criteria to determine
whether a governmental entity is to be held liable as an operator of
a facility.44 Despite the difficulty inherent in doing so, courts gen-
erally use the same standards for a governmental entity as they do
for a private entity in determining this. 45 The two main tests courts
use to determine operator liability of private and governmental en-
tities are the "authority-to-control" test and the "actual control"
test.
4 6
private entity); see also NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection and Energy v. Glouces-
ter Envtl. Management Servs., Inc., 821 F. Supp. 999, 1004-05 (D.N.J. 1993); Read-
ing Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 155 B.R. 890, 897 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (addressing issue
of governmental operator liability and stating "[t]he government is liable [under
CERCLA] in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-governmental
entity").
43. For cases illustrating that governmental ownership of a site may be the
basis of liability, see United States v. Allied Corp., Nos. C-83-5898-FMS, 1990 WL
515976, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 1990) (basing liability on federal ownership of
military base); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection and Energy, 821 F. Supp. at 1004-05
(basing liability on municipal ownership of sanitary landfill). For illustration of
the potential for governmental operation of a site to be the basis of such liability,
see United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,656 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990)
(basing liability on State of California's operation of hazardous waste site).
44. For cases highlighting courts' approval with holding both governmental
and non-governmental entities liable as operators, see supra note 42. The confu-
sion regarding what factors contribute to a finding of operator liability stems from
CERCLA's circular definition of "operator" as "any person... operating such facil-
ity." CERCLA § 101 (20) (A) (ii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (ii). See also FMC Corp. v.
United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating CER-
CLA's definition of operator "gives little guidance to the courts in determining if a
particular person or entity is liable as an operator"). Although the Court in United
States v. Bestfoods, U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 1887 (1998), provided lower courts with
some guidance for determination of the operator status of a private entity, no uni-
form body of case law exists to guide courts in making the operator determination
for a governmental entity. See Davison, supra note 33, at 75-78 (explaining lower
courts have no "universal formula" for determining when person, especially gov-
ernmental entity, is operator of facility under CERCLA sections 107(a)(1) or
107(a) (2)).
45. See Davison, supra note 33, at 70 (stating courts usually employ same total-
ity-of-relevant-circumstances standard to determine liability of both governmental
and private entities). See also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (applying operator criteria
used in corporate context to governmental regulatory activity). Courts have not
always found it easy, however, to apply the same operator standards. See Davison,
supra note 33, at 70-71 (explaining courts have encountered difficulty in determin-
ing whether to hold governmental entities liable as PRPs on basis of governmental
regulatory activities, involvement with private business facilities or cleanup of haz-
ardous substances).
46. For use of the "authority to control" test, see Nurad, Inc. v. William E.
Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating authority to control,
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The authority-to-control test holds liable those parties who
have the authority to control a contaminated site's operations. 47 In
contrast, the actual control test, which recently gained support
from the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Bestfoods,
holds liable only those parties who actively control or participate in
a site's operations.48 In applying either of these tests, courts must
balance CERCLA's purpose of making responsible parties pay for
cleanup with the opposing interest in not creating unlimited liabil-
ity for parties who were only remotely involved. 49 Thus, whether a
court finds a governmental entity liable as an operator depends not
not actual control, is appropriate standard); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901
F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990) (employing authority-to-control standard).
For a discussion of the authority-to-control test, see infra note 47.
For use of the "actual control" test, see Bestfoods, U.S. at__, 118 S. Ct. at 1887
(indicating support for actual control test); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy
B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994); FMC Corp., 29 F.3d
at 843; United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (employing
actual control test). For discussion of the actual control test, see infra note 48.
47. For a definition of the authority-to-control test, see Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842
(stating authority to control, not actual control, is appropriate standard). For
cases adopting the authority-to-control test, see United States v. Carolina Transformer
Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1992) (adopting authority-to-control test); Fleet
Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558 (using similar authority-to-control test used in Nurad and
Carolina Transformer and holding "a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement
with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference
that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose"). Cf East Bay
Mun. Util. Dist. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 948 F. Supp. 78, 92 (D.D.C.
1996) (specifying, in applying test, "[tihe authority to control must be specifically
related to the control of waste disposal" and "general authority to control opera-
tion of the facility is not the relevant legal standard").
48. See Bestfoods, __ U.S. at __, 188 S. Ct. at 1887-88 (setting forth new corpo-
rate operator definition in terms similar to those found in actual control test and
analyzing whether lower court properly applied actual control test in parent-sub-
sidiary context).
In Bestfoods, the United States Supreme Court indicated support for the "ac-
tual control" test:
[U]nder CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs the work-
ings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility. To sharpen the
definition for purposes of CERC[A's concern with environmental con-
tamination, an operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations spe-
cifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the
leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance
with environmental regulations.
Id. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
49. See Davison, supra note 33, at 78 (citing Reading Co., 155 B.R. at 908. Ad-
dressing the policy debate surrounding the question of whether to hold municipal-
ities legally responsible for cleaning up landfills, one author explains:
On one hand, if municipalities fail to [dispose] of waste, they create a
potential health risk. On the other hand, if municipalities do [dispose of
the waste], they potentially face millions of dollars in liability. ...
[M]unicipalities often are punished disproportionately by having to pay
high damage awards resulting from the CERCLA liability scheme. More-
over, as the law is currently interpreted, there is very little municipalities
[Vol. X: p. 361
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only upon which test the court uses, but also upon whether a find-
ing of liability is consistent with CERCLA's goals.5
0
1. Authority-to-Control Test
The defendant's authority to control a site's operations, re-
gardless of whether the defendant exercises it, is the focus of the
authority-to-control test.5 1 In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons, Co., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used this test to hold
tenant defendants not liable as operators. 52 The Nurad court based
its decision on the defendants' lack of authority to control the oper-
ations or decisions regarding hazardous substance disposal at the
site. 53 As shown in Nurad, the test thus ensures that a party who has
the authority to cleanup a site, but declines to actually exercise it,
will be held responsible for cleanup costs. 54
Further, the authority-to-control test allows a court to consider
a defendant's actual control of a site as evidence of its authority to
control, subject to one limitation; that is, a court may not make a
showing of actual control a prerequisite for finding authority to
control. 55 The effect of this limitation is that a court may consider a
commingling of actual control and authority-to-control facts only as
can do to avoid liability, other than to hope that the waste deposited in
the landfills is not hazardous.
Smith, supra note 8, at 594.
50. See Davison, supra note 33, at 78 (stating whether courts hold governmen-
tal entities liable depends upon test chosen and whether courts find governmental
liability proper within CERCLA's purposes). See also FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 840, 843
(discussing CERCLA's goals and concluding actual control test should be applied
to determine operator status of governmental entity engaged in regulatory
activities).
51. For discussion of the authority-to-control test, see supra note 47 and infra
note 54 and accompanying text.
52. See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842 (reasoning showing of actual control over facil-
ity is unnecessary for operator liability as long as authority to control is present).
53. See id. (stating district court properly found defendants not liable as oper-
ators due to lack of authority to control operations involving disposal of site's haz-
ardous substances or contents of site's underground storage tanks).
54. See id. (stating test "properly declines to absolve from CERCLA liability a
party who possessed the authority to abate the damage caused . . . but who de-
clined to actually exercise that authority by undertaking efforts at a cleanup").
55. See id. (explaining court may consider defendant's actual conduct as evi-
dence of authority to control but may not "inflate" item of evidence into "disposi-
tive legal requirement"). See also City of N. Miami, Florida v. Berger, 828 F. Supp.
401, 409-10 (E.D. Va. 1993) (relying on Nurad to adopt authority-to-control test).
In Berger, the undisputed facts showed that the defendant had "exercised direct
and substantial control over the day-to-day operations of the landfill" and acted
"essential [ly]" as an "on-site manager." Berger, 828 F. Supp. at 410. The Berger
court held that, even though the exercise of actual control is unnecessary under
the test the Fourth Circuit enunciated in Nurad and Carolina Transformer, it can
constitute clear evidence of the defendant's authority to control the site. See id.
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evidence of authority to control.56 For example, in Northwestern Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp. the District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia applied the authority-to-control test
to hold a corporate entity liable as an operator of a facility. 57 The
defendant had authority to control because it leased portions of the
facility where releases occurred and it had an official license to
store and use radioactive materials on the property.58 The North-
western court explained that the defendant's actual control of other
parts of the facility, including installation of underground storage
tanks, maintenance of trailers, and storage of chemical waste, was
further evidence of this authority.59
By considering actual control as evidence of authority to con-
trol, a court's application of the authority-to-control test may, in
practice, stray from the goal of focusing solely on a defendant's au-
thority to control a site.6 0 This commingling of two types of evi-
dence has led at least one court to explicitly adopt the actual
control test in an effort to return to what it deemed to be the crux
of the matter; that is, actual control.61 Although the circuit courts
56. For a discussion of the permissible use of facts that demonstrate actual
control as evidence of authority to control, see supra note 55.
57. See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F.
Supp. 389, 397-98 (conferring operator status upon plaintiff who was lessor/occu-
pier of site for having authority to control). The court in Northwestern explained
that the authority-to-control test is based on the notion that an occupier or user of
a facility who has the authority to control it must bear the responsibility of prevent-
ing environmental harm. See id. at 398.
58. See id. (clarifying that plaintiff "was not an innocent tenant, far removed
from the area of contamination and powerless to effect remedial cleanup"). The
Northwestern court added that in addition to having the authority to control the
contaminated areas, the plaintiff also had actual control over the area and was
directly participating in activities which contributed to the release of hazardous
substances. See id.
59. See id. For a discussion of the use of actual control as evidence of an
entity's authority to control, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. For a discussion of the goals of the authority-to-control test, see supra note
54 and accompanying text. Notably, one court's departure from the authority-to-
control test was so extensive it created a new hybrid test that combines both the
actual control and authority-to-control tests. See United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d
1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting different test whereby court may not hold
party liable as operator unless party "(1) had authority to determine whether haz-
ardous wastes would be disposed of and to determine the method of disposal and
(2) actually exercised that authority, either by personally performing the tasks neces-
sary to dispose of the hazardous wastes or by directing others to perform those
tasks") (emphasis added). This test runs counter to the authority-to-control test's
goal of holding liable those parties who had the authority to cleanup the site but
who failed to act pursuant to that authority. See Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842.
61. See Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 474, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1996)
(choosing between actual control test and authority-to-control test). The Washing-
ton court examined two authority-to-control cases, Kaiser Aluminum Lumber Co. v.
Catellus Development Corp., in which the Ninth Circuit held a contractor liable as an
[Vol. X: p. 361
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are divided regarding which test to employ, more circuits now em-
ploy the actual control test than the authority-to-control test.62
2. Actual Control Test
Under the actual control test, a court will deem an entity an
operator if the entity "play[s] an active role in running the facility,
typically involving hands-on, day-to-day participation in the facility's
management."63 The test requires an entity to exercise "substantial
control" over the facility, which involves its active involvement in
the facility's operations. 64 The precise meaning of these terms,
however, is often elusive.
operator, and Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., in which the Seventh
Circuit refused to impose liability upon a builder, and stated that the distinction
between the two results was "an exceedingly fine line" because "[i]n neither of
these cases did the result turn on unexercised 'authority'; it turned upon what the
alleged operator actually did." Id. (citing Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1992);
Hines, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)). The Washington court then concluded that
"[a]ctive involvement in the activity that produces the contamination is what is
required for 'operator' liability." Id.
62. For a list of cases in which the First, Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits
adopted the actual control test, see Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 314; LongBeach
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.
1994); FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843; Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d at 27. For a list of
cases in which the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits adopted the authority-to-control
test, see Nurad, 966 F.2d at 842; Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1558. Note also that
the Court's Bestfoods operator definition comports in large part with the actual
control test. See Bestfoods, __ U.S. at _, 118 S.Ct. at 1887 (formulating new opera-
tor definition for parent-subsidiary context). For the Court's definition of opera-
tor as stated in Bestfoods, see supra note 48.
63. LongBeach Unified Sch. Dist., 32 F.3d at 1367 (stating "[t]o be an operator
of a hazardous waste facility, a party must do more than stand by and fail to pre-
vent the contamination. It must play an active role in running the facility, typically
involving hands-on, day-to-day participation in the facility's management"). See also
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting
operator must actively run facility by managing daily activities). Debate, however,
arises regarding whether these activities must relate to pollution-based activities or
to general activities at the facility as a whole. Compare, e.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth.
v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (l1th Cir. 1993) (stating Eleventh Circuit
standards do not require individuals to actually control specific decisions to dis-
pose of hazardous substances to be held liable as operator), with United States v.
Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating officer or shareholder of corpo-
ration can be found liable only when there exists actual control of disposal of haz-
ardous substances at facility).
64. See FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 833, 843 (extending actual control test from
corporate field to governmental field). The court in FMC Corp. relied on its earlier
holding in Lansford-CoaldaleJoint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp. in finding that an en-
tity will be liable under the actual control test if there is evidence that it exercised
"substantial control" over the facility. FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (citing Lansford-
Coaldale, 4 F.3d 1209, 1222 (3d Cir. 1993)). As the Lansford-Coaldale court stated,
"[t]o be an operator requires more than merely complete ownership and the con-
comitant general authority or ability to control that comes with ownership. At a
minimum [substantial control] requires active involvement in the activities of the
1999]
15
Barron: Passing the Operator Buck in United States v. Township of Brighto
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
376 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. X: p. 361
Courts have encountered tremendous difficulty in determining
what activities demonstrate "substantial control" and "day-to-day
control," especially in cases involving governmental regulation of
privately owned facilities.65 Recently, in United States v. Bestfoods, the
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the definition of
"corporate operator."66 Rejecting CERCLA's definition of operator
as "useless," the Court stated that the term should be given its "ordi-
nary or natural meaning."67 An operator is thus "someone who di-
rects the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of a
facility." 68 In the context of "environmental contamination," the
Court stated that an operator must exercise such control over those
operations pertaining specifically to the maintenance and disposal
of hazardous waste.69 These standards comport with the traditional
actual control test, even though the Court did not specifically desig-
nate them as such. 70 Although Bestfoods clarified the operator defi-
[facility]." 4 F.3d at 1222 (quoting United States v. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d 24, 27
(1st Cir. 1990)).
65. For a discussion of the difficulty courts have encountered in finding oper-
ator status based on governmental regulation of a site, see Davison, supra note 33,
at 83-98.
66. See generally United States v. Bestfoods, U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 1876 (1998)
(involving CERCLA liability between corporate entity and subsidiary and adopting
actual control concepts for determining operator status applicable to both corpo-
rate and governmental entities). For further examples of application of the actual
control test to both private and governmental entities, see Vertac, 46 F.3d at 806
(applying actual control test used in corporate setting to governmental entity);
FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843 (discussing actual control test with regard to corpora-
tions and immediately applying those standards to governmental entity's activities
at site); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1450 (E.D.
Cal. 1995) (rejecting owners' allegations United States was operator of mine be-
cause owners did not allege United States had "'hands-on, day-to-day' manage-
ment" of site or "controlled the cause of contamination ... ".(quotations
omitted)).
67. See Bestfoods, U.S. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1887 (citing Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)). See also Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating "[t]he circularity [of CERCLA's
operator definition] strongly implies.., that the statutory terms have their ordi-
nary meanings rather than unusual or technical meanings").
68. Bestfoods, U.S. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1887. For the text of the Bestfoods
operator definition, see supra note 48. For further discussion of the Bestfoods hold-
ing, see infra notes 127-58 and accompanying text.
69. Id. (defining CERCLA liability as meaning "an operator must manage, di-
rect, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations hav-
ing to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about
compliance with environmental regulations"). Id.
70. See id. In Bestfoods, the district court had applied the actual control test to
the parent corporation's relationship with the subsidiary, focusing on whether the
corporation controlled the subsidiary's operations. See id. The Bestfoods Court dis-
agreed with the district court's particular application of the test, explaining that
the proper inquiry was not "whether the parent operated the subsidiary, but
rather, whether the parent operated the facility." Id. In setting forth the proper
16
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nition as it applies in the corporate context, it contributed little to
courts' determination of operator liability of a governmental en-
tity.71 Questions regarding the meaning of actual control require-
ments, such as "substantial control" and "day-to-day control,"
therefore, remain in the governmental operator liability context.72
3. Factors for Determining Actual Control
Courts vary regarding the factors they deem determinative of a
governmental entity's operator status, particularly when the govern-
mental entity is regulating a site. 73 While some courts hold that
mere regulation of a site suffices to impose operator liability, other
courts require more.74 This section illustrates the different ap-
proaches courts take on the difficult issue of governmental opera-
tor liability.
At least one court has held that regulation alone is enough to
impose liability upon a governmental entity. In FMC Corp. v. United
States Department of Commerce, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a governmental entity is liable under CERCLA section 107
when its regulatory activities are extensive enough to qualify it as an
standards listed in supra note 48, the Court thus did not disagree with the actual
control test, but instead with the district court's application of it. See id. The
Bestfoods standards are therefore clarifications of basic actual control principles,
aimed to ensure that the test will be applied properly. See id. at 1888 (explaining
analysis should rest on operations of facility, not on parental operation of
subsidiary).
71. See id. (discussing operator liability only in corporate context). Although
the criteria set forth in the Bestfoods operator definition apply to the determination
of the operator liability of a governmental entity, questions arise regarding the
adequacy of a corporate definition's application to a governmental entity. See id. at
324 (Moore, J., concurring) (acknowledging courts should hold governmental
and corporate operators similarly liable, however, policy considerations indicate
governmental entities might require different factors or levels of satisfaction of
corporate criteria). Even Judge Boggs, writing for the majority in Brighton Town-
ship, specifically addressed the difficulty of applying an operator definition in-
tended for a "corporate honeycomb" to a governmental entity. See id. at 314. For
an extensive discussion of the problems inherent in determining the operator lia-
bility of a governmental entity acting in a regulatory capacity, see Davison, supra
note 33, at 83-98.
72. For an introduction to the difficulty found in applying corporate operator
standards to a governmental entity, see supra note 71.
73. For a discussion regarding the lack of uniformity as to which factors qual-
ify a governmental regulator as an operator, see infra note 87 and accompanying
text.
74. See generally Davison, supra note 33, at 82-83 (explaining that although
most courts hold regulatory activity alone is insufficient to render governmental
entity liable, regulatory activity sometimes suffices if it amounts to "operation" for
purposes of actual control test).
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operator of a facility. 75 In that case, the United States commis-
sioned a privately-owned plant to make war products during World
War 11.76 The United States made most decisions regarding the
plant's operation. 77 The FMC Corp. court concluded that the
United States' regulatory activities were "extensive enough" under
the actual control test because the United States exerted substantial
control over the facility's daily operations and policy decisions.7 8
Conversely, other courts have held that a governmental entity
should not be liable as an operator solely on the basis of regulatory
activities. In United States v. Dart Industries, Inc., the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that neither governmental regulatory activ-
ity, nor governmental failure to exercise regulatory authority, suf-
fices to establish liability.79 The Dart court concluded that the
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC) did not have operator status even though it inspected the
site and approved applications for waste disposal at the site.80 The
75. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843-45
(3d Cir. 1994) (stating regulatory activity may be sufficient to impose operator lia-
bility upon governmental entity). The FMC Corp. court stated:
Just as the government can be liable for hazardous wastes created at a
military base it owns, the government can be liable when it engages in
regulatory activities extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility
or an arranger of the disposal of hazardous wastes even though no private
party could engage in the regulatory activities at issue.
Id. at 840.
76. See id. at 843.
77. See id. The United States determined the products that the facility would
manufacture, controlled the supply of raw materials, supplied equipment for use
in the manufacturing process, participated in the management of the labor force,
had authority to remove workers, controlled the price of the product and con-
trolled who would purchase the product. See id.
78. Id. (stating United States had both "'substantial control' over facility as
well as 'active involvement in activities there"' (quotation omitted)).
79. See United States v. Dart Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 145 (4th Cir. 1988)
(determining whether South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC) should be deemed operator of Fort Lawn landfill site based on its
regulatory activities there). For a discussion of Dart's holding, see Davison, supra
note 33, at 86.
80. See id. at 146 (listing activities DHEC conducted at site). The Dart court
explained:
DHEC approved or disapproved applications to store wastes at Fort Lawn,
inspected the site, and required proper transportation of the wastes deliv-
ered to Fort Lawn. However, there is no allegation that DHEC went be-
yond this governmental supervision and directly managed Carolawn's
employees or finances at the Fort Lawn site. Thus, this court finds that
DHEC is not an owner or operator under [CERCLA].
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Fourth Circuit based its decision on the fact that DHEC did not
directly manage the waste site's employees or finances.8 '
Likewise, in United States v. New Castle County, the Delaware Dis-
trict Court held that the state of Delaware was not liable as an oper-
ator when the state selected, planned, regulated and supervised a
landfill. 82 The New Castle court listed the following factors as rele-
vant to the determination of governmental operator liability:
Whether the person sought to be strapped with operator
status controlled the finances of the facility; managed the
employees of the facility; managed the daily business oper-
ations of the facility; was responsible for the maintenance
of environmental control at the facility; and conferred or
received any commercial or economic benefit from the fa-
cility, other than the payment or receipt of taxes.83
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the New Castle court
concluded that the state of Delaware was not liable because these
factors were not substantially present.8 4
When similar factors are substantially present, however, a court
may be more inclined to impose operator liability upon a govern-
mental entity for its regulatory activities. In United States v. String/el-
low, a special master held the state of California liable as an
operator of a landfill based on the state's regulatory activities.8 5
81. See id. (expressing approval of district court's finding DHEC's activities
were "merely 'a series of regulatory actions'") (citation omitted).
82. See United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 869 (D. Del.
1989). The State of Delaware's regulatory activities included selection of the site
for the landfill, planning and design of the landfill and its operations, determining
types of wastes to be disposed of at the site, issuing a permit for the landfill, requir-
ing site users to submit periodic reports to the state and monitoring the site to
ensure compliance with landfill regulatory standards. See id. at 862.
83. Id. at 869 (noting list of factors is not exclusive and courts should decide
each case based on "unique factual situation presented"). Importantly, the factors
the New Castle court set forth include more types of activities than those the Dart
court previously set forth. Compare New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 869 (listing site selec-
tion and planning, decisions regarding types of waste to dispose, issuing permits
and monitoring site as determinants of operator liability), with Dart, 847 F.2d at
146 (listing only management of employees and finances as criteria for operator
liability).
84. See New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 869 (adding State of Delaware should not be
held liable as operator merely because its regulatory program may have been more
inclusive than another state's program). The New Castle court concluded that de-
spite CERCLA's goals, operator liability should not be overly expansive because
"'statutes have not only ends but also limits,' and the limits of operator status do
not encompass [these] actions...." Id. at 870 (quoting Edward Hines Lumber Co.
v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1988)).
85. See generally United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,656 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 9, 1990) (holding State of California liable as operator because it ex-
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The state had actual control over the facility because it chose the
landfill's location, designed and built the landfill, hired and super-
vised the employees responsible for day-to-day operations, and set
the job responsibilities for each of these employees.8 6
The lesson of these cases is evident. Despite the seemingly
clear rule that a governmental entity must have actual control over
a facility's daily operations to be held liable as an operator, courts
differ greatly as to what factors should be determinative of this day-
to-day control.87
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYsis
A. The Opinion of the Court
The Sixth Circuit's Brighton Township decision consisted of
three opinions: Judge Boggs, writing for the majority; Judge Moore,
concurring; andJudge Dowd, dissenting.8 8 In the majority opinion,
Judge Boggs set forth several broad standards to guide a determina-
tion of governmental operator liability.8 9 First, Judge Boggs ex-
tended the use of the actual control test from the corporate context
to a case involving a governmental entity-defendant. 90 Beginning
ceeded regulatory responsibilities by "regularly visiting the site, hiring employees,
making operational decisions, and controlling waste dumping").
86. See FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 844 (3d
Cir. 1994). (recounting facts Stringfellow court found dispositive). The Stringfellow
court held that the special master correctly decided that the state negligently se-
lected, investigated, designed and inspected the site. See String/ellow, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. at 20,656. The court based its conclusion on the state's failure to conduct
soil, core or other tests to locate the waste. See id.
87. For a discussion of how courts differ regarding the factors that should
determine the actual control test's requirement of day-to-day control, see supra
notes 73-86 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Brighton Township,
153 F.3d 307, 326 (6th Cir. 1998) (Moore, J., concurring) (recognizing "[c]ourts
seeking to determine whether a government entity maintained 'substantial con-
trol' over a facility generally look at whether the state exercised 'considerable day-
to-day control' or 'hands-on' control. Unfortunately, courts differ as to what cir-
cumstances amount to day-to-day control." (quoting FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 844)).
88. See Brighton Township, 152 F.3d 307.
89. See id. at 314-16.
90. See id. at 314. Judge Boggs distinguished the corporate-form cases in
which the test had been used as "not directly applicable" in this case because cor-
porate and governmental control of a facility are "vastly different." Id. See generally
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996)
(adopting actual control test); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st
Cir. 1990) (employing actual control test).
Judge Boggs reasoned that "[t] he task of placing responsibility for an action in
one or more cells of a corporate honeycomb is vastly different than evaluating...
the responsibility of a single entity in a vacuum, especially in the context of a strict
liability statute." Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 314. According to Judge Boggs,
however, these cases highlighted the importance of establishing "some actual con-
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his analysis with the Court's "sensible" Bestfoods definition of opera-
tor, Judge Boggs explained that the ordinary meaning of "to oper-
ate" includes the "direction of a facility's activities." 91
Second, Judge Boggs addressed the question, previously raised
in Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., of whether a failure
to act suffices to render a governmental entity liable as an opera-
tor.9 2 The Nurad court held that it does not suffice, explaining that
actual control requires a showing of affirmative acts.9 3 Judge Boggs
agreed with the Nurad court, and, further, stressed that once a de-
fendant's affirmative acts demonstrate actual control, a defendant
is liable for all of the resulting harm, whether from omissions or
affirmative acts.94
Third, Judge Boggs examined the Third Circuit's holding in
FMC Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce that a governmen-
tal entity may be liable "'when it engages in regulatory activities
extensive enough to make it an operator of a facility."' 95 He ex-
plained that a court's task is to distinguish between governmental
regulation of a landfill exercised as a "conventional police power"
trol" and supported the Bestfoods mandate that a defendant perform some affirma-
tive acts before it may be liable as an operator. See id.
91. Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 314. Judge Boggs discussed the "circular"
definition of CERCLA that the Bestfoods Court faced and found the Court's ap-
proach "sensible" for defining the term "operator" by its ordinary meaning. Id.
Judge Boggs quoted from Bestfoods, acknowledging that "'when [Congress] used
the verb 'to operate,' we recognized that the statute obviously meant something
more than mere mechanical activation of pumps and valves, and must be read to
contemplate 'operation' as including the exercise of direction over the facility's
activities."' Id. (quoting Bestfoods, U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at 1889). See also Edward
Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing "circularity" of CERCLA operator definition implies "statutory terms have their
ordinary, rather than unusual or technical meanings").
92. See Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4th
Cir. 1992) (holding liable defendants possessing authority to abate damage im-
proper disposal caused but declining to actually exercise authority by instituting
cleanup). Judge Boggs stated that although the Sixth Circuit declined to adopt
the Fourth Circuit's authority-to-control test, Nurad accurately raised the issue of
the effect of failure to act on liability. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 315.
93. See id.
94. See id. Judge Boggs explained that once affirmative acts render a party an
operator, that party may not claim later that it was not responsible for the particu-
lar hazard its actions caused. See id. A contrary holding would allow operators to
escape liability despite their negligent management of their facilities and would
defeat the strict liability scheme of CERCLA section 107(a). See id. Judge Boggs
also noted that the township is barred from asserting the defense that the act or
omission of a third party caused the harm, since the defense excludes those third
parties to whom the operator is contractually bound. See id. at 315 n.8.
95. Id. at 315 (quoting FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't Commerce, 29 F.3d
833, 844 (3d Cir. 1999)). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding in FMC
Corp. v. United States Department of Commerce, see supra notes 64, 75-78 and accompa-
nying text.
1999]
21
Barron: Passing the Operator Buck in United States v. Township of Brighto
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
382 VILLANOVA ENVMRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X: p. 361
and governmental macromanagement of a landfill disguised as
"regulation."96 Judge Boggs, however, refused to adopt any particu-
lar factors a court must consider in making this distinction, assert-
ing that it is a fact intensive inquiry that can only be decided on a
case-by-case basis.97 Accordingly, he remanded the case to the dis-
trict court to decide the issue, using his opinion as guidance. 98
B. Judge Moore's Concurrence
Writing separately to address the policy considerations in-
volved in determining the operator status of a governmental entity,
Judge Moore concluded that a governmental entity should be held
liable as an operator if it asserts actual control over the pollution-
related activities at a facility.99 Judge Moore explained that, despite
96. Id.
97. See id. at 315 n.9 (acknowledging although some ofJudge Moore's factors
may aid in making operator determination, "[p] recisely because this is a fact-inten-
sive inquiry, district courts should not feel bound to weigh any factors that do not
apply to the facts of their particular case"). Judge Boggs continued:
All too often, lower courts transform our suggestions into requirements.
No court should feel bound by the list of factors the concurrence has
provided, helpful though it is. Rather, courts should see if the plain lan-
guage of the statute applies - that is, whether the defendant is an 'opera-
tor' - and should look to the results we and others have reached, and to
the facts we have found most dispositive in reaching them. What courts
should not do. .. is take a list of reasons why the facts in one case led the
court to a particular result, and transform it into a mechanical checklist
of narrow and rigid factors.
Id. (citation omitted).
98. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 315-16. Judge Boggs identified several
facts in explaining why he could not conclude as a matter of law that the township
was not an operator. See id. at 315. First, the record showed that the agreement
between Vaughan Collett and the township required the landfill to meet the Board
of Appeals' specifications. See id. Second, the township repeatedly made ad hoc
appropriations to the landfill and arranged for bulldozing and other maintenance
when either of the Colletts could not perform the task himself. See id. at 316.
Third, the township assumed responsibility for improving the site's condition both
before and after state scrutiny, even as early as 1965. See id.
Although Judge Boggs was "sympathetic" to the township's problem, he found
"no basis [ ] to conclude that the township was somehow forced to take such direct
responsibility and action." Id. Judge Boggs indicated that if the township had
been amenable to spending more funds in the 1960s and 1970s, it could have
avoided liability by disposing of its waste elsewhere and by cleaning up the landfill
site. See id.
99. See id. at 323-28 (Moore, J., concurring). She then added a list of factors
that should guide a court's determination of operator liability for a governmental
entity. See id. at 327. For a list of these factors, see infra note 113 and accompany-
ing text.
Although Judge Moore clearly stated that control over pollution-related activi-
ties is a prerequisite for governmental operator liability, she did not clarify whether
actual control over a facility's general activities is also required. See id. at 323-28.
In one portion of her concurrence she indicates that only control over pollution-
related activities is necessary because "[a] governmental entity may maintain a sig-
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CERCLA's mandate that courts are to treat governmental entities in
the same manner as private entities for liability purposes, CERCLA
does not state whether the same level of control over a facility ren-
ders both governmental and private entities liable.' 0 0
In determining whether the same level of control should apply
to both,Judge Moore identified several competing policies. 10 1 One
policy favors the prevention of courts' hindrance of governmental
regulation of hazardous waste sites. 10 2 The opposing policy pro-
nificant degree of control over a facility's treatment of hazardous waste without
'hands-on' involvement in a facility's [general] activities." Id. at 327. In another
portion, however, she expresses support for courts that adopt a "broader notion"
of defining " 'actual control' to encompass not only the micromanaging of a facil-
ity's pollution activities, but also macromanaging a facility's operations." Id. (foot-
note and citations omitted). Each statement contradicts the other as to whether
actual control over the facility's general activities is an additional requirement for
liability to attach. There are several indications in Judge Moore's concurrence,
however, of her view that actual control over a facility's general operations is not
an additional requirement.
First, Judge Moore emphasizes that a governmental entity can have a great
degree of control over a facility's pollution-related activities despite the fact that it
does not control the facility's general operations. See id. Second, she advocates
that courts adopt a "broad conceptualization" of the meaning of actual control,
but refers to the dual requirement of both general and pollution-related activities
as a "broader notion" utilized by courts. Id. (emphasis added). Focusing solely on
the language of these two juxtaposed sentences, it may be that Judge Moore
thought the dual requirement was a "broader" notion than what she would re-
quire. Finally, the factors Judge Moore set forth are specifically pollution-related
and are meant "to determine whether the regulatory activities of a governmental
entity went beyond mere regulation and amounted to macromanagement of the
facility in question." Id. For purposes of this Note, however, it is necessary only to
identify that governmental operator liability turns on whether the governmental
entity exerts actual control over a facility's pollution-related activities.
100. See id. at 323-24. Despite CERCLA's directive that courts treat govern-
mental and non-governmental operators alike for liability purposes, "the statute is
silent as to whether the same threshold of control over a facility renders both a
governmental entity and a non-governmental entity an operator." Id. at 324.
Judge Moore added that "[a] governmental entity responsible in part for the re-
lease or threatened release of hazardous substances from a facility 'shall be subject
to the provisions of [CERCLA] in the same manner and to the same extent, both
procedurally and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability
under section 9607."' Id. at 323-24 (quoting CERCLA § 101 (20) (D), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20) (D)). For a more complete discussion of the coextensive liability of
governmental and non-governmental entities, see supra note 42.
101. See id. at 324 (noting policy considerations indicate inadvisability of con-
sidering same factors similarly where governmental conduct occurs in regulatory
context). But see FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843
(3d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing governmental and non-governmental entities share
same status as potentially responsible parties and applying corporate factors to
both).
102. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 324 (explaining because public en-
trusts governmental entities with regulatory power as guardians of health, safety
and welfare, courts should avoid inhibiting governmental regulation of facilities).
Judge Moore emphasized that governmental regulation is becoming increasingly
necessary to remedy environmental problems involving hazardous waste release.
1999] 383
23
Barron: Passing the Operator Buck in United States v. Township of Brighto
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
384 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. X: p. 361
motes CERCLA's broad remedial purpose of holding all responsi-
ble parties liable.10 3 Judge Moore stated that a court must balance
both interests in imposing operator status upon a governmental
entity.10 4
After criticizing the majority's opinion for failing to define a
clear actual control standard for governmental regulatory activity,
Judge Moore identified factors based on recent case law that should
comprise an actual control standard.10 5 First, she rejected the ap-
proach of the Delaware District Court in United States v. New Castle
County, in which a governmental entity must engage in "far-reach-
ing" activities at a facility before it will be deemed an operator. 10 6
See id. As such, "courts should take care not to inhibit unduly the regulatory activi-
ties" of governmental entities and should consider the "possibility that 'widespread
state liability may have a chilling effect on long-term remedial efforts, since states
may be unwilling to act when CERCLA liability is sure to be imposed.'" Id. (quot-
ingJaneen Olsen, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of State Liability Under CERCLA
Section 107(a), 2 ViLL. ENvTL. LJ. 183, 204 (1991)).
103. See id. at 324-25. Judge Moore stated that a court cannot ignore CER-
CIA's legislative history, which "makes clear that 'Congress intended that those
responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs
and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created."' Id. (quot-
ing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986)).
104. See id. at 325 (stating "our task of identifying when a governmental entity
becomes an operator requires us to balance carefully CERCIA's broad remedial
purpose against concerns of deterring state involvement in regulating hazardous
waste management and clean-up").
105. See id. (agreeing actual control test should apply, but expressing disap-
proval with majority's and dissent's opinion because unclear standards failed to
provide lower courts with direct guidance regarding when governmental regula-
tory activities are extensive enough to impose operator status upon governmental
entity). Before beginning her discussion of the factors that should determine op-
erator status, Judge Moore indicated her agreement with the majority's adoption
of the actual control test, its rejection of the authority-to-control test and Judge
Boggs' assertion that once a governmental entity engages in affirmative acts of
operating a facility, any subsequent omissions will be grounds for liability as well.
See id.
Then, Judge Moore established the basic elements of actual control. See id. at
325-26. She stated that "[a] governmental entity exercises actual control over a
facility where its involvement extends beyond 'mere regulation' and amounts to
'substantial control', or 'active involvement in the activities' at the facility." Id. at
325 (quoting FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 843; United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 46
F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 1995)). Judge Moore emphasized that, under Bestfoods,
these activities must be specifically related to pollution. See id., 153 F.3d at 326-27.
The actual control "standard 'requires a fact-intensive inquiry' and consideration
of the 'totality of the circumstances."' Id. (quoting Vertac, 46 F.3d at 808; United
States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 864-870 (D. Del. 1989)). Judge
Moore concluded by stating that although courts will uniformly look for "consider-
able day-to-day control" or "hands on" control, "unfortunately, courts differ as to
what circumstances amount to day-to-day control." Id. (citations omitted).
106. See id. (citing New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 866-67). Judge Moore stated
that the New Castle approach "essentially equat[es] substantial control with main-
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Judge Moore concluded that the Nev Castle approach was too leni-
ent on governmental entities because it finds a governmental entity
liable only if the entity profited commercially from the involve-
ment. 0 7 She explained that such a requirement effectively creates
a forbidden regulatory exception to CERCLA liability. 10 8 Judge
Moore continued by rejecting the approach adopted in United States
v. Dart Industries, Inc. because it too narrowly defined "hands-on
control" as direct management of the facility's employees or fi-
nances. 10 9 She explained that this approach frustrates CERCLA's
remedial purpose by shielding governmental entities from liability
even when they exercise significant control over pollution-based
activities.'10
taining 'proprietary or financial interests' or 'commercial interests,' in the facility."
Id. (quoting New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 866-67).
107. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 326 (stating, "New Castle approach se-
verely undermines CERCLA's remedial purpose by limiting" liability to instances in
which governmental entity seeks profit and thus excludes more common situation
of extensive government regulatory involvement where governmental entity ob-
tains no profit).
108. See id. (stating New Castle approach effectively carves out exception for
governmental regulation from liability under CERCLA section 107(a)). This reg-
ulatory exception conflicts with CERLCA's remedial goal of holding responsible
parties liable, even on the basis of regulatory conduct. See id. See also FMC Corp., 29
F.3d at 839-42 (refusing to create regulatory exception for government when gov-
ernment acts in regulatory capacity); United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc.,
881 F. Supp. 1432, 1448 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (finding no remedial or regulatory excep-
tion to CERCLA liability).
109. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 326 (citing United States v. Dart Indus.,
Inc., 847 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1988)). Judge Moore noted that the Fourth Cir-
cuit's approach is less protective of governmental entities than the New Castle ap-
proach. See id. Under its narrow approach, the Dart court refused to hold the
State of South Carolina liable as an operator under CERCLA because it did not
directly manage the employees or finances of the facility in question. See id. (citing
Dart, 847 F.2d at 146).
110. See id. at 327 (refusing to agree to Dart court's "limited notion" of activi-
ties qualifying as actual control due to result of shielding from liability governmen-
tal entities responsible for contamination because entities exercised control over
facility's pollution-based operations). Judge Moore also disagreed with Judge
Dowd's analysis because it essentially echoed the Dart approach. See id. at 326 (stat-
ing Judge Dowd also set criteria very high for determining day-to-day operations,
including hiring and supervising employees and control of financial decisions).
Specifically, Judge Moore differed with Judge Dowd regarding the proper interpre-
tation of the Bestfoods holding. See id. at 327 n.6. Judge Dowd construed Bestfoods
to mean that a court may hold a governmental entity liable for its regulatory activi-
ties if it hires or supervises employees or controls financial decisions of the facility
as a whole, regardless of whether it involves pollution-based activities, whereas
Judge Moore interpreted Bestfoods to mean that a court may hold a governmental
entity liable if it exerts substantial control over a facility's pollution-related activi-
ties. See id. at 326-27. For a more complete discussion of the differences between
Judge Moore's andJudge Dowd's views, see supra notes 88-109; infra notes 111-124
and accompanying text.
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Judge Moore thus concluded that a "broad conceptualization"
was necessary."1 She insisted that a governmental entity should be
deemed an operator only if it asserts actual control over the facil-
ity's pollution-related activities.112 Further, she listed the factors
courts should consider when determining whether the governmen-
tal entity exercises actual control over pollution-related activities,
such as the government's knowledge of environmental dangers,
participation in design, opening and closing of the facility, and
monitoring of hazardous waste disposal.'13 Judge Moore empha-
sized that this standard prevents a governmental entity from escap-
ing liability merely because it neither hires and supervises
employees nor makes financial decisions for the entity as a
whole. 114
C. Judge Dowd's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Dowd interpreted United States
v. Bestfoods to mean that operator liability attaches only if the gov-
ernmental entity managed the facility's day-to-day activities. 115
Under this standard, Judge Dowd concluded that the majority
111. See id. at 327 (reasoning governmental entity may have much control
over facility's pollution treatment without "hands-on involvement" in facility's ac-
tivities). Judge Moore supported a "broad conceptualization" of actual control "in
order to strike the appropriate balance between CERCLA's remedial purpose and
concerns over chilling regulatory efforts in the hazardous waste arena." Id.
112. See id. at 327. For a discussion of Judge Moore's emphasis on pollution-
based activities as a requirement for governmental operator liability, see supra note
99 and accompanying text.
113. See id. The following is the complete list of Judge Moore's factors:
[T]he government's expertise and knowledge of the environmental dan-
gers posed by hazardous waste, establishment and design of the facility,
participation in the opening and closing of a facility, hiring or supervis-
ing employees involved in activities related to pollution, determination of
the facility's operational plan, monitoring of and control over hazardous
waste disposal, and public declarations of responsibility over the facility
and/or its hazardous waste disposal.
Id. (echoing six of eleven factors listed in United States v. Strinfellow, 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. 20656, 20658 (C.D. Cal. Jan.9, 1990)). Judge Moore emphasized that these
factors are not exhaustive, nor does any one factor necessarily suffice to render a
governmental entity liable as an operator. See id. She added that district courts
should weigh these factors along with any others that indicate actual control over a
facility's hazardous waste operations to determine whether the governmental en-
tity's regulatory activities "went beyond mere regulation and amounted to
macromanagement of the facility in question." Id. For a discussion of these fac-
tors' shortcomings, see infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
114. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 (clarifying her position, Judge
Moore stated, "[a] governmental entity may maintain a significant degree of con-
trol over a facility's treatment of hazardous waste without 'hands on' involvement
in a facility's activities").
115. See id. at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting).
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should not have found the township liable as an operator of a
facility. 116
Initially, Judge Dowd explained that a court should not find a
governmental entity liable based on a low threshold of control. 117
He pointed to the "narrow holding" in Bestfoods which provides
that, within the corporate context, activities which involve the facil-
ity but are consistent with the parent's status (such as monitoring
performance, supervising finance decisions and stating general pol-
icies and procedures) do not give rise to operator liability.1 18 Judge
Dowd applied this standard to find the township's actions insuffi-
cient to render it liable as an operator. 119 Judge Dowd then ex-
amined the pertinent case law and concluded that only if a
governmental entity manages the day-to-day activities of the facility
should a court find it liable. 12° Relying on the elements the courts
in FMC Corp., Dart and New Castle used, Judge Dowd stated that the
requisite high level of control over day-to-day operations includes
116. See id. (agreeing with court's adoption of actual control standard for
Sixth Circuit but stating final judgment should be for township because activities
did not equate to actual control under Bestfoods standard).
117. See id. In Judge Dowd's view, Bestfoods requires that a governmental en-
tity meet a higher threshold of control before a court can deem it an operator. See
id.
118. See id. The Bestfoods "narrow holding" provides:
"[A] ctivities that involve the facility but which are consistent with the par-
ent's investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary's performance,
supervision of the subsidiary's finance and capital budget decisions, and
articulation of general policies and procedures, should not give rise to
direct liability." (citation omitted). The critical question is whether, in
degree and detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent of the par-
ent alone are eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility.
United States v. Bestfoods, _ U.S. at -, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1889 (1998) (citation
omitted).
119. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 333. First, Judge Dowd explained that
although Bestfoods specifically addressed the operator question in the corporate
context and Brighton Township involved the liability of a governmental entity, the
Sixth Circuit should apply Bestfoods "narrow holding." Id. Judge Dowd then con-
cluded that the township's actions were insufficient to render it liable as an opera-
tor because the actions were consistent with its role as a regulator under the
Bestfoods "narrow holding." Id. at 334. For a discussion of the Bestfoods "narrow
holding" see supra note 118.
120. See id. Judge Dowd relied on the following cases in making his conclu-
sion: FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 844 (holding United States liable as operator because
of "considerable day-to-day control" over production process, building and con-
trolling plants, supervising employee conduct, supplying machinery and control-
ling product marketing and price); Dart, 847 F.2d at 146 (finding no operator
liability where government entity did not directly manage waste site's employees,
finances, or daily activities); New Castle, 727 F. Supp. at 870 (finding no state liabil-
ity as operator where periodically inspected site and mandated some details of soil
construction and compaction, but did not manage landfill's day-to-day
operations).
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hiring and supervising the facility's employees and controlling its
financial decisions.121
Judge Dowd thus refused to hold the township liable as an op-
erator because the township did not hire the employees at the land-
fill, did not have the authority to supervise or fire them, and did not
manage the landfill's finances. 122 Although the township arguably
maintained a degree of regulatory control over the facility, accord-
ing to Judge Dowd, these regulatory activities alone could not cre-
ate liability without evidence of day-to-day management. 123 Judge
Dowd supported his position with the district court's explicit find-
ings that Collett, not the township, managed the daily operations of
the facility and that the township did not exercise its control over
the facility on a daily basis. 124
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The existence of three different opinions from a three-judge
bench illustrates that the Sixth Circuit did not solve the governmen-
tal operator mystery through its decision in Brighton Township. This
result stems from the Sixth Circuit's inadequate application of the
Bestfoods operator standard, a task which has now become the re-
121. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 334. Judge Dowd noted that although
these cases were decided before Bestfoods, they are in complete agreement with the
Bestfoods holding that an operator must "direct[ ] the workings of, manage[ ], or
conduct[ ] the affairs of a facility." Id. (citation omitted).
122. See id. at 334. In pertinent part, the district court found that the Colletts
maintained the daily operations of the landfill by setting hours of operation, di-
recting residents where to dump different kinds of trash, deciding where and when
to bury or burn trash, and charging dumping fees to non-residents. See id. The
findings state that the township did not exercise its control over the facility on a
daily basis. See id. Relying on the minutes of the Board meetings, however, the
district court found sufficient evidence that the township did maintain actual con-
trol over operations at the dump. See id. Although the district court found that
the township exercised actual control over the facility, Judge Dowd focused on the
lack of evidence of its daily control over the facility. See id. Specifically, Judge Dowd
noted that the record was void of any evidence that the township hired or man-
aged the facility's employees or directed its finances. See id.
123. See id. Judge Dowd stated that Brighton Township's giving Collett the
permit to open the landfill and keeping the authority to "supervise" the facility did
not "give rise to a finding of actual control in the absence of evidence of day-to-day
management." Id. (citing Bestfoods, __ U.S. at -, 118 S. Ct. at 1889).
124. See id. at 335. In addition, Judge Dowd dissented from the scope of the
majority's remand. See id. The majority affirmed certain fact findings that the dis-
trict court purportedly made. See id. Judge Dowd concluded that "[t]hese 'find-
ings' that the majority 'affirms,' .. . are not restricted to the actual findings of fact
made by the district court, but rather include some 'findings' made by the majority
after its own review of the testimony given at the three-day bench trial." Id. Judge
Dowd stressed that an appellate court may not engage in such fact finding and
must restrict its review to the district court's fact findings. See id.
28
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/3
UNITED STATES V. TowNSHIP OF BRIGHTON
sponsibility of the lower courts. 1 25 This section discusses the court's
failure to determine whether, under Bestfoods, CERCLA operator
status for governmental entities is based on either pollution-related
activities or day-to-day control of the facility's general activities.1
2 6
A. Different Interpretations of Bestfoods
In Bestfoods, the Court defined who qualifies as an operator
under CERCLA. 127 The first part of the Bestfoods operator defini-
tion states that an operator is one "who directs the workings of,
manages, or conducts the affairs of a facility."1 28 The next part of
the definition specifies that "an operator must manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically related to pollution. -129 Despite
the ostensible clarity of this definition, the Sixth Circuit formulated
three distinct interpretations of the term "operator."
Judge Boggs' majority opinion focused solely on the first part
of the Bestfoods operator definition. 130 For Judge Boggs, the crucial
issue mirrored that of Dart and New Castle, that is, whether the gov-
ernment "was running the facility or merely regulating it."131 If the
125. See Bestfoods, - US at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1887. At issue in Bestfoods was
whether a parent corporation could be held liable as an operator under CERCLA
for the costs of cleaning up industrial waste its subsidiary generated. See id. at -,
118 S. Ct. at 1881. Importantly, Bestfoods did not address the operator liability of a
governmental entity based on its regulation of a privately-owned facility. See id. In
Brighton Township, the Sixth Circuit applied the Bestfoods standard to the govern-
mental regulation of a privately-owned facility, but it failed to set forth substantial
factors to guide the analysis. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 315. The Sixth
Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the majority opinion's actual control standards. See id.
126. For an overview of the Brighton Township majority's ambiguous response
to this issue, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. In her concurrence,
Judge Moore raised a second, and corollary, issue that was present in Brighton
Township, If operator status is strictly dependent upon pollution-related activities,
what is the requisite level of control that must be exerted over these activities? See
Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 n.6 (discussing Bestfoods and stating Court "left
open the question of whether participation in a facility's pollution-related opera-
tions must involve substantial day-to-day control in order to hold a party liable as
an operator for response costs").
127. See Bestfoods, - U.S. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1887.
128. Id. For the text of the operator definition the Bestfoods Court set forth,
see supra note 48.
129. Id.
130. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 314. Indeed, at no point in his opinion
did Judge Boggs state a requirement that a facility's activities must be specifically
related to pollution. See id. at 313-16. For a discussion of Judge Boggs' opinion,
see supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
131. Id. at 316 n.ll. Although the crucial issue was the same in the three
cases, Judge Boggs distinguished Brighton Township from Dart and New Castle by
highlighting that the township took "hands-on, non-regulatory action distinct from
that of the entities in Dart and New Castle." Id. He also emphasized that although
1999]
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government's regulation of the facility was so extensive as to consti-
tute "macromanagement" of the facility, then the court would
deem the governmental entity an operator. 132 By framing the issue
in this manner, Judge Boggs implicitly adopted the view that the
governmental entity must exert control over the activities of the fa-
cility as a whole, not solely over pollution-related activities to be
held liable as an operator. 133 Judge Dowd also relied solely on the
first part of the Bestfoods definition in concluding that control over
day-to-day activities of the facility as a whole is the key to operator
liability.13 4
Judge Moore's dissenting opinion, however, focused on both
parts of the Bestfoods operator definition. 135 She concluded that a
governmental entity exercises actual control over a facility when its
involvement exceeds regulation and amounts to active participation
in the facility's pollution-related activities. 136 Additionally, Judge
Moore noted that Bestfoods failed to specify the requisite level of
the facts of Brighton Township are more like Dart than FMC Corp., the court should
not split the differences and similarities between two cases from other jurisdic-
tions. See id. Instead, the court should state the law and apply it to the facts of
Brighton Township. See id. For a discussion of the facts of FMC Corp., see supra notes
75-78 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts of Dart, see supra notes
79-81 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts of New Castle, see supra
notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
132. See id. at 315 (citing FMC Corp., 29 F.3d at 840). Judge Boggs explained
that as a result of FMC Corp., "a governmental entity, by regulating the operation of
a facility actively and extensively enough, can itself become an operator." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). According to Judge Boggs, the court's "task is to distinguish (1)
situations in which a governing authority uses its conventional police power to
ensure that a dump does not pose a threat to public health and safety; from (2)
situations in which the 'regulations' are just the government's method of
macromanaging the facility." Id. (footnote omitted).
133. See id. at 315. Although it is unclear, Judge Boggs seems to indicate that
control over pollution-related activities is evidence of only control over general
activities. See id. This inference is drawn from the fact that Judge Boggs discusses
only general activities of control throughout his opinion. See id. When reviewing
the district court's fact findings and explaining why he could not conclude that the
township was not an operator, however, Judge Boggs cites Bestfoods as defining the
term "operator" to "include [an] entity that makes 'decisions about compliance
with environmental regulations.'" Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
134. See id. at 333-34. For Judge Dowd's adoption of the actual control test
and interpretation of case law prior to Brighton Township, see supra note 121 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Judge Dowd's dissent, see supra notes 115-
24 and accompanying text.
135. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 325-28 (Moore, J., concurring).
136. See id., 153 F.3d at 325. Judge Moore added that Bestfoods requires these
activities to be "specifically related to pollution." Id. (citing Bestfoods, __ U.S. at -'
118 S. Ct. at 1887). For a discussion ofJudge Moore's concurrence, see supra notes
99-114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether Judge Moore would
additionally require that actual control be exerted over a facility's general opera-
tions, see supra note 99.
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control an entity must exert over a facility's pollution-related activi-
ties to be held liable as an operator. 137 However, she did not pro-
vide an explicit standard. 138 Instead, she set forth several factors
trial courts should consider in determining the operator liability of
a governmental entity, including whether the government knows of
the facility's environmental problems, hires and supervises employ-
ees whose jobs relate to pollution, monitors the disposal of hazard-
ous waste or takes public responsibility for the site's hazardous
waste disposal. 139 Judge Moore thus avoided the task of determin-
ing the requisite level of control over pollution-related activities by
setting forth factors that courts may consider at their discretion. 140
B. Potential Reasons For Different Interpretations of Bestfoods
1. Difficulty in Making Case Law Comport With Bestfoods
One potential reason for the Sixth Circuit's divergence in
Brighton Township is the difficulty inherent in applying the factors
amounting to actual control in the existing case law to the new-
improved Bestfoods standard.1 41 Decisions prior to Bestfoods relied
mainly on the level of control exerted over a facility's operations as
a whole and made no distinction for specific pollution-based activi-
ties.142 Bestfoods introduced the more specific pollution-related re-
137. See id. at 327 n.6 (noting Bestfoods Court did not decide "whether partici-
pation in a facility's pollution-related operations must involve substantial day-to-
day control in order to hold a party liable for response costs"). For further men-
tion of this question left unanswered by the Brighton Township court, see supra note
126.
138. See id. at 327, n.6 (observing Bestfoods left question unanswered and turn-
ing discussion toward new area).
139. See Brighton Township, 153 F. 3d at 327.
140. For the complete list of factorsJudge Moore set forth and a discussion of
the discretion trial courts have in using them, see supra note 113 and accompany-
ing text.
141. See Bestfoods, U.S.-, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (representing most recent expres-
sion on issue of operator liability). In Bestfoods, the Court emphasized the impor-
tance of courts' focusing on the proper relationship between a proposed operator
and its subsidiary or subservient entity when applying the actual control test. See id.
at __, 118 S.Ct. at 1887. The Court explained that courts must focus on the pro-
posed operator's pollution-related activities at the facility run by the subsidiary or sub-
servient entity, rather than on the proposed operator's control over the
management of its subsidiary or subservient entity. See id. (emphasis added). For a
discussion of the Bestfoods holding, see supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
For an analysis of the differences between the Bestfoods holding and pre-existing
case law, see infra note 142 and accompanying text.
142. See Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Liv-
ing Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating "[t]o be an operator . . .a
party must do more than stand by and fail to prevent the contamination. It must
play an active role in running the facility, typically involving hands-on, day-to-day
participation in the facility's management."); FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of
1999]
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quirement. 143 The current confusion regarding whether the
requirement is actual control over activities as a whole or over pol-
lution-based activities may thus be a result of this development. 144
2. Difficulty in Interpreting Bestfoods' "Narrow Holding"
Another reason for the divergence may be what Judge Dowd
referred to as Bestfoods' "narrow holding." 145 Bestfoods first purports
to impose operator liability upon an entity that exercises substantial
control over a facility's pollution-related activities. 146 Nonetheless,
in its "narrow holding," Bestfoods exempts a parent corporation
from liability for activities it conducts at the facility in accordance
with its investor status. 147 Judges Moore and Dowd seized upon this
distinction, and although each extended the principle to the gov-
ernmental regulatory context, they reached different
conclusions. 148
Judge Moore used this passage to support her already stated
contention that general activities do not create liability unless they
Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating "'substantial control' requires
'active involvement in the activities of the other corporation"' and holding govern-
mental entity liable based on general management activities over facility) (citation
omitted); Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonoli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1224
n.7 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating "a company may be considered an operator even if it
did not exert control over the hazardous waste disposal decisions of an affiliated
corporation, as long as there is otherwise sufficient indicia of substantial manage-
ment control over the affairs of the affiliate"); Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth
Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (1 lth Cir. 1993) (stating under Eleventh Circuit's stan-
dard, individual need not have actually controlled specific decision to dispose of
hazardous substances for court to hold it liable). But see United States v. Gurley, 43
F.3d 1188, 1193 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating court can find officer or shareholder of
corporation liable only if he actually controlled disposal of hazardous substances at
facility).
143. See Bestfoods, __ U.S. at -, 118 S. Ct. at 1887 (stating purpose of pollu-
tion-related standard was "[t]o sharpen the definition for purposes of CERCLA's
concern with environmental contamination .... ).
144. For a discussion of the differences between the Bestfoods standard and
the criteria found in pre-existing case law, see supra notes 141-43 and accompany-
ing text.
145. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting) (setting
forth Bestfoods operator definition and listing Court's "specific activities that would
and would not be sufficient for operator liability") (citing Bestfoods, -U.S. at -,
118 S. Ct. at 1889)). For a discussion ofJudge Dowd's dissent, see supra notes 115-
24 and accompanying text.
146. See Bestfoods, - U.S. at-, 118 S. Ct. at 1887. For the text of the Bestfoods
operator definition, see supra note 48.
147. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 n.6, 333 (quoting Bestfoods, - U.S.
at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1889). For the text of this "narrow holding," see supra note 118.
148. See id. at 327 n.6 (Moore, J., concurring) (demonstrating differences in
ways Judges Moore and Dowd interpreted Bestfoods "narrow holding").
[Vol. X: p. 361
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are specifically related to pollution.1 49 Under her interpretation of
this passage, activities such as hiring or supervising employees or
making financial decisions are as consistent with a governmental
entity's regulatory status as they are with a parent corporation's in-
vestor status. 150 Thus, under this "narrow holding," such activities
are insufficient to impose liability unless they are specifically related
to pollution.1 51
Judge Moore's opinion is internally inconsistent. Whereas
Bestfoods sets forth activities that are consistent with a parent corpora-
tion's investor status, Judge Moore failed to set forth activities that
are consistent with a governmental entity's regulatory status. 15 2 By im-
plying that no difference exists between the two contexts, Judge
Moore weakened her earlier rationale that the regulatory function
of a governmental entity is unique and that a requirement of pollu-
tion-related activities to impose liability protects this function. 153
To be consistent with her premise that governmental regulation re-
quires special attention, she should have defined governmental reg-
ulatory activities and pollution-related activities.154 Such precise
definitions would prevent a chilling effect on governmental regula-
tion by ensuring that a governmental entity would be judged by
government-specific rather than corporate standards.1 55
149. See id. (emphasizing pollution-related requirement as means to balance
two competing policies of broad, remedial purposes of CERCLA against concern
regarding chilling actions of environmental regulatory bodies).
150. See id. (stating "contrary to judge Dowd's position, the hiring or supervi-
sion of a facility's employees or control over a facility's financial decisions does not
give rise to operator liability, unless of course such activities are 'specifically related
to pollution'").
151. See id.
152. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 n.6 (Moore, J., concurring). In
Bestfoods, the Court listed activities consistent with a parent's investor status as
"monitoring of the subsidiary's performance, supervision of the subsidiary's fi-
nance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and proce-
dures .... . Bestfoods, - U.S. at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1889. In Brighton Township,
although Judge Moore stated that the Bestfoods principle is applicable to cases aris-
ing outside the parent-subsidiary context, she did not state which governmental
regulatory activities would be exempted from "operator" analysis under the same
principle of this "narrow holding." See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 n.6.
153. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 324 (noting unique function of govern-
mental entity to protect public health, safety and welfare through increased regula-
tions in environmental arena). For a discussion ofJudge Moore's emphasis on the
distinct nature of governmental regulatory activity and the balancing of interests
courts must conduct, see supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of how Judge Moore failed to define the pollution-re-
lated activities that would give rise to governmental operator liability, see supra
note 152 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of Judge Moore's concern with chilling governmental
regulation of hazardous waste sites, see supra notes 102, 153 and accompanying
text.
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Conversely, Judge Dowd relied on the same passage to support
his position that general activities do not confer liability unless they
fall outside the governmental entity's regulatory sphere, regardless
of whether they are pollution-related. 156 Judge Dowd, like Judge
Moore, found that the activities consistent with a parent's investor
status are the same as for a governmental entity's regulatory sta-
tus.157 Judge Dowd's analysis, however, did not contradict any ear-
lier parts of his opinion, since he made no distinction at any point
between governmental regulatory activities and typical corporate
activities. 15s
C. The Weak Final Product
Overall, the Sixth Circuit set forth a weak opinion in Brighton
Township because it failed to enunciate a workable standard for
lower courts to use in determining whether a governmental entity
should be deemed an operator based on its pollution-related activi-
ties or its general activities involving control of the facility. 159 What
Judge Boggs called a "proper standard," others may call a sham.160
Establishing that the actual control test applies, that affirmative acts
are required to render an entity liable and that a governmental en-
tity may be liable when its regulatory activities are extensive enough
to make it an operator, are all restatements of pre-existing law.161
Judge Boggs' failure to set forth factors for lower courts' analysis
156. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 333 (Dowd, J., dissenting).
157. See id. The inference that Judge Dowd defines corporate and govern-
mental activities in the same manner rests in Judge Dowd's failure to define any
separate standards for governmental regulatory activity. See id. at 333-34. Indeed,
Judge Dowd specifically relies on the factors enunciated in pre-existing case law
pertaining to corporate entities, stating:
[T]he case law demonstrates that the criteria for finding such a high level
of control over day-to-day operations include hiring and supervising the
employees, and the control of the financial decisions of the facility.
Although these cases were decided prior to the Bestfoods case, they are
completely in line with Bestfoods' holding ....
Id. at 333-34.
158. See id. at 333-35.
159. For a critical discussion of the Brighton Township court's failure to clarify
whether the basis of operator liability must be pollution-related activities or gen-
eral activities, see supra notes 125-40 and accompanying text. For a narrative analy-
sis of the court's opinion, written by Judge Boggs, see supra notes 88-98 and
accompanying text.
160. Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 315.
161. See id. at 314-16. For a discussion of Judge Boggs' opinion, see supra
notes 88-98 and accompanying text. Judge Boggs' findings do not supplement
pre-existing case law to answer the question of whether the activities establishing
actual control for a governmental entity must be pollution-related or based on
general activities as a whole. See id.
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perpetuates the confusion regarding the determination of the oper-
ator status of a governmental entity.1 62 In short, Judge Boggs
passed the "governmental operator" buck to the district court. Fur-
ther, Judge Dowd's approach is similarly insufficient because it dis-
tinctly overlooked the second part of the Bestfoods definition
requiring an entity to "manage, direct, or conduct operations spe-
cifically related to pollution. 163
For these reasons, the soundest approach is Judge Moore's
holding that actual control over the pollution-related activities of a
facility are required to confer operator status upon a governmental
operator.164 Her failure, however, to state the requisite level of con-
trol over a facility's pollution-related activities to confer operator
liability upon a governmental entity, and her failure to define what,
if any, pollution-based activities are consistent with the governmen-
tal entity's status as a regulator, limit the usefulness of her analy-
sis.165 Because of this ambiguity, she too passed the buck to the
district court.
VI. IMPACT
The Sixth Circuit's failure to set forth workable criteria to use
in determining whether a governmental entity is liable as an opera-
tor for its regulation of a privately-owned facility shifts the burden
of interpreting Bestfoods to lower courts and other circuits. 166 The
key question remains unanswered: Does Bestfoods mean that, in the
CERCIA context, a governmental entity is liable based on its pollu-
tion-related activities at a facility or on its general activities of actual
control over the facility as a whole?167 Certainly, Judge Boggs' si-
lence on the issue of pollution-related activities may indicate that a
162. See id. at 315 n.9 (explaining he did not include any factors because,
since this is to be fact-intensive inquiry, district courts should not be bound by any
factors that do not pertain to their case). For further discussion of this point, see
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of Judge Dowd's conclusion that courts should hold a
governmental entity liable based on its general, rather than pollution-related, activ-
ities at a facility, see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion in Judge Moore's opinion, see supra notes 99-114 and
accompanying text.
165. For a discussion of the two flaws of Judge Moore's analysis, see supra
notes 126, 152 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the ambiguity present in the standard the Bestfoods
Court set forth, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion of this unanswered question, see supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text.
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pollution-based requirement is unnecessary. 16 3 But Judge Boggs'
failure to provide explicit standards permits other courts to reach
disparate results, even in similar factual contexts, as long as they
address the three key elements (actual control, affirmative acts and
the level of extensiveness of the regulatory activity)., 6 9
When a court must decide a close call of liability for a govern-
mental entity, policy concerns regarding the appropriate level of
leniency will be outcome determinative.1 7 0 Courts that focus on
CERCLA's goal of "making the polluter pay," regardless of who the
polluter is, will interpret Bestfoods as Judge Moore did in Brighton
Township and hold liable any governmental entity that exercises ac-
168. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 314 (declining to include pollution-
based requirement when setting forth standard to be an operator, Brighton Town-
ship must have engaged in "some affirmative acts," that is, "that they 'operated' the
site by 'direct[ing] the workings,' 'manag[ing],' or 'conduct[ing] the affairs' of the
facility").
169. For a fuller discussion of the criteria Judge Boggs set forth in Brighton
Township, see supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. Courts will turn to Judge
Moore's and Judge Dowd's opinions as blueprints of differing Bestfoods interpreta-
tions when they findJudge Boggs' standard unworkable. For a discussion ofJudge
Moore's concurrence, see supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Judge Dowd's dissent, see supra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
170. For example, Judge Boggs, in his opinion for the court, touched on the
budgetary and political restraints on governmental entities like Brighton Town-
ship. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 316. Judge Boggs stated:
While we are sympathetic to the plight of the township, which could not
have been happy when this dirty problem fell into its lap, there is no basis
for us to conclude that the township was somehow forced to take such
direct responsibility and action. Perhaps ironically, if Brighton Township
had been willing to spend more money in the 1960s and 1970s, it could
have made other, arm's-length arrangements for the disposal of local re-
fuse and the rehabilitation of Collett's property, and probably avoided
operator liability.
Id.
In the lone amicus brief, Michigan Townships Association (MTA) argued on
behalf of Brighton Township against operator liability, relying in part on policy.
See Brief for Brighton Township as amicus curiae at 10, United States v. Township of
Brighton, 153 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 1998) (No. 96-1802). MTA presented the follow-
ing argument:
Brighton Township by having some regulations in 1960 is being punished
and the court in essence is saying that it would have been better off had
the Township had no regulations at all then [sic] to have some, because
despite the fact that they had no ownership in the property, no day-to-day
control over the operations, no supervision of employees, etc., the Town-
ship can still be found liable for all costs of clean-up of hazardous sub-
stances regardless of whether those materials were disposed of by
Township residents. Thus, municipalities instead of becoming more in-
volved in environmental concerns will now be encouraged by this deci-
sion to have as little or no responsibility at all. Is this what our legislators
intended when they passed CERCLA?
Id. (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the role that policy arguments play
in a court's holding, see supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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tual control over a facility's pollution-related activities. 171 Other
courts will struggle to balance the consequences of holding finan-
cially-strapped governmental entities liable with the competing pur-
pose of making responsible parties pay.172 These courts will prefer
the approach adopted by Judges Boggs and Dowd in Brighton Town-
ship, which requires actual control over the facility's general
operations.173
The doors the Sixth Circuit left open in Brighton Township must
now be closed by other courts, at least one of which must take a
stance and state whether pollution-related activities or general ac-
tivities at a facility are the proper focus of inquiry for making the
operator determination. In Bestfoods the Court laid the groundwork
for such a distinction. 174 In accepting the buck the Sixth Circuit
passed, the courts must follow the Bestfoods mandate by setting forth
a standard with explicit factors to demonstrate the level of control
necessary to impose operator liability on a governmental entity reg-
ulating a privately-owned site.
Catherine A. Barron
171. For a discussion of Judge Moore's concurrence, which focuses on pollu-
tion-related activities as the standard for CERCLA operator liability, see supra notes
99-114 and accompanying text. Because both Bestfoods and Brighton Township leave
open the question of the requisite level of control over these pollution-related ac-
tivities, courts will have to determine that level for themselves based on the facts of
the case, the finances available to the governmental entity and policy considera-
tions. See Brighton Township, 153 F.3d at 327 n.6.
172. For arguments against adopting a lenient approach for governmental
entities, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. For arguments in favor of
limiting governmental liability, see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of Judge Boggs' approach, see supra notes 88-98 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Judge Dowd's approach, see supra notes
115-24 and accompanying text.
174. See Bestfoods, US at __, 118 S. Ct. at 1889. For the text of the Bestfoods
operator definition, see supra note 48.
1999]
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